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Résumés
The topic of this article is the attempt of an industrial city to convert its model of development
through a political strategy, in an age of post-Fordist restructuring and economic globalization.
The city is Turin, wherein between 1993 and 2011, in a long cycle of government, a ruling elite
acted to avoid the social and economic decline of the city by promoting an ambitious agenda.
The category of ‘urban regime’ is the interpretive framework of the analysis. To contribute to
the understanding of urban change dynamics and to highlight some still ambiguous questions
in urban regime theory, the present study aims at reconstructing: a) which circumstances
contributed to the development and then to the establishment of the urban regime; b) which
factors have probably undermined its robustness and limited its success.
Le sujet de cet article est la tentative d’une ville industrielle de convertir son modèle de
développement à travers une stratégie politique, à l’ère de la globalisation économique et de la
restructuration postfordiste. Il s’agit de la ville de Turin dans laquelle, entre 1993 et 2011, une
élite dirigeante stable a agi afin d’éviter un déclin économique et social en promouvant un
agenda politique ambitieux.
La cadre interprétatif de l’analyse est celui des régimes politiques urbains. Pour contribuer à la
compréhension des dynamiques du changement urbain à Turin et pour clarifier certaines
dimensions parfois ambiguës de la théorie des régimes, l’article vise à reconstruire : i) les
circonstances qui ont permis le développement et l’établissement du régime politique urbain
turinois ; ii) les facteurs qui ont probablement sapé sa robustesse et limité son succès.
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Texte intégral
The topic of this article is the attempt of an industrial city to convert its model of
development through a political strategy, in an age of post-Fordist restructuring and
economic globalization. The city is Turin, wherein between 1993 and 2011, in a long
cycle of government, a ruling elite acted to avoid the social and economic decline of the
city by promoting an ambitious agenda1.
1
In the early Nineties, Turin was a medium-sized city with clear signals of an
industrial crisis. The great automotive industry Fiat, which has guided and shaped the
expansion of the city in the last century, has reduced workers and closed down several
establishments. In the Eighties, the restructuring of the company had caused social
mobilization and territorial redistributions of residents, abandoning the empty
establishments and increasing territorial fragmentation and social marginality. In order
to face these challenges, which required a more vigorous government action, public
institutions, local and regional authorities and political forces that had hitherto
governed the city seemed unable to formulate a programme of renewal and to propose
policies matching up with the problems.
2
In this complex scenario, a coalition of center-left parties supported by a new
alignment of political and social forces ascended to power, governing the city for
eighteen years under the leadership of two mayors, Valentino Castellani and Sergio
Chiamparino. The core of the government project may be summed up with the label
‘beyond Ford’. The attempt is to lead Turin towards new production goals and more
advanced social and territorial balance, making the city able to compete with other
European ones.
3
Many scholars and commentators have focused on the programmes and the
outcomes of the urban change that took place in Turin in the considered period. The
large majority of them has praised the innovation of the agenda and of the policy-
making procedures, the strength of government and the successful outcomes. In these
analysis Turin is deemed as a city that managed to achieve most of its objectives and to
solve many of its problems, and that is going to solve the others as soon as the policies
of the new course will have deployed all their transformative potential. Not only an
example of good practices and administration, but also of a successful plan able to
overcome the challenges of economic modernization and urban transformation, an
exception within the Italian scenario (Pinson 2002; Dente et al. 2005; Scamuzzi 2005;
Winkler 2007; Emmott 2010). We are rather inclined to temper the enthusiasm of such
judgments, while admitting the relevance of the case within the Italian landscape of
stagnant and politically depressed cities. We are not denying neither that Turin has
been the scene of a high-profile political experiment, nor that the city has experienced
significant changes, becoming more and more attractive for tourists and for its own
citizens. But in the light of recent empirical evidence the results are uneven and, in
many cases, not fulfilling the intentions and expectations of the players themselves, and
well below the appreciation that the city enjoys in Italy and abroad (Belligni and
Ravazzi 2012).
4
Whether it was a real ‘revolution’ or a stalemate after a promising start, its
governance model has highly contributed to gain the positive image of the city. This
model shows significant similarities with several American cases of city government of
the last decades, conceptualized as ‘urban regime’ by the scholarly literature on urban
5
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1. Urban regimes
politics2. The category of ‘urban regime’ is the interpretive framework through which
we analyzed the twenty-year government cycle running Turin at the turn of the 21st
century.
After briefly recalling the highlights of urban regime theory to outline the essential
analytical basis of our interpretation, our exposure will be split into three parts, roughly
corresponding to the three phases of the government cycle. In the first part, we shall
explain which circumstances contributed to the development and then to the
establishment of the urban regime. In the second, we shall summarize the projects, the
efforts and the resources that have contributed to the consolidation and stabilization of
the urban regime. In this part, we shall trace the profile of the Turin governing elite and
its role in the evolving dynamics of the regime. In the final part, we shall focus on the
declining phase of the regime, highlighting the factors that have undermined its
robustness and limited its success. In the conclusions we shall argue which elements of
this case-study may help urban regime theory to step forward in explaining the
dynamics of urban change.
6
With the theory of urban regimes, developed in the United States in the first half of
the Eighties (Fainstein and Fainstein 1986; Elkin 1987; Stone 1989), urban politics
have been brought back to the research agenda as a subject of empirical investigation
and of theoretical analysis, after being long relegated to the margins of mainstream
politological research programmes3. In the wake of a renewed interest in the political
and economic role of cities, urban regime analysis combines innovative governance
theory, political economy approach and policy analysis.
7
From governance theory the urban regime approach derives the view that in complex
and fragmented contexts, such as modern cities, urban government cannot be practiced
as hierarchical control (power over) by a group of elected decision-makers who impose
unilateral decisions, but only as cooperation (power of) between political authorities
and social actors (Stoker 1995, Stone 2006). In this perspective, urban decision-making
systems ordinarily function as governance arenas where local authorities collaborate
with private actors in order to formulate and implement public agendas (John and Cole
2000).
8
Compared to policy analysis, the approach of urban regimes aims to broaden the
focus of research from single public policies and their policy networks to the systemic
impact (locality wide) of long-term programmes and the enduring cooperation schemes
supporting them, by shifting the emphasis from single policy issues to the agenda and
the outcomes determining the urban change.
9
Last but not least, the urban regime approach emphasizes agency rather than
structure: urban politics, in spite of the ‘city limits’ (Peterson 1981) and the bounded
rationality of the actors, can affect the social and economic system through the choices
and the strategic action of the local elite. Although the imperatives of economic growth
cannot be reasonably eluded - especially after that the crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian
structure and the globalization of the economy have exposed the industrial cities of the
West to the risk of decline - the urban decision-makers still have significant chances in
choosing their own development model and the related policies. In this perspective,
cities are responsible for their own well-being and architects of their own future (Stone
and Sanders 1987; Logan and Swanstrom 1990, Clark 1994, Harding 1999; Bagnasco
and Le Galés 2001, Savitch and Kantor 2005).
10
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Urban regime is only one of the modes that cities adopt to establish governance
practices (Di Gaetano and Klemanski 1999). The heuristic utility of the category
actually lies in its ability to discriminate a regime from other kinds of urban
governance. Then, which variables are relevant to define a local government system as
an urban regime? In a nutshell, the elements that allow to distinguish an urban regime
from other forms of governance seem to be the following (Dowding et al., 1999;
Dowding 2001; Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Stone 2005 and 2006; Mossberger
2009): a) a long-term priority agenda with a clearly identifiable and viable core of
intentions4; b) a coalition of public and private actors based on an informal and durable
cooperation designed to promote and support the implementation of the agenda; c) the
mobilization of public and private resources necessary to the achievement of targets.
The need to deal with a development crisis is not universally recognized as a key
element of urban regimes5.
11
If the elements above trace the boundaries between urban regimes and other forms
of urban governance (such as policy networks or partnerships), the differences within
the category are also theoretically significant. Literature has produced various
classifications of urban regimes, some of which are redundant. For our purposes, the
crucial distinction is between pro-welfare and pro-growth regimes (Savitch and Kantor
2002, Baer 2005)6.
12
Pro-welfare regimes are led by progressive coalitions and aim to equity, social quality
and citizen empowerment. Welfare policies are seen not only as a way to redistribute
resources and improve urban services, but also as a strategy to support local demand
(Ferman 1996). Although there are updated versions that attempt to combine social
cohesion and environmental sustainability, this family of regimes seems to belong
mainly to the Keynesian age of the compromise between state and market (Harvey
1989). Since the Eighties, pro-welfare regimes have become rarer and mostly unstable,
both in Europe and in the USA (Stone 2004, Mossberger 2009).
13
In a pro-growth urban regime, economic growth is the main goal, while social
integration cannot be anything more than a byproduct or a constraint. The strategic
priority is to create a good business climate to attract private and public investments,
innovative companies, managerial functions, skilled workers, creative talents and
tourists, and the developmental policies (in the form of supply-side policies) are the
best instruments to achieve these goals. Pro-growth regimes privilege efficiency and
risk and try to minimize regulation and taxes. The majority of urban regimes
established in the Eighties either belongs to or gravitates towards this model (Peterson
1981; Savitch and Kantor 2002).
14
Pro-growth agendas may consist of different sets of policies and may be supported by
different coalitions (Lee 2006). Some cities focus on advanced technologies and
research, sometimes called ‘knowledge machines’ or ‘triple helix model’ (Etzkowitz and
Leydesdorff 2000; Koch and Stahlecker 2006)7, others try to foster culture, creativity
and entertainment (often labeled as ‘knowledge machines’ or ‘entertainment
machines’). These kinds of pro-growth regimes differ from the so-called ‘growth
machines’, aiming at enhancing real property gains and led by local economic elites
(Molotch and Logan 1987; Vicari and Molotch 1990; Harding 1994; Stone 1989).
15
The case of Turin appears to belong to the class of pro-growth regimes, albeit with
some deviations. Labelling its core agenda as one of the three subtypes mentioned
above is however more challenging: in the Turin experiment all the three agendas are
intertwined, designing a hybrid which is difficult to classify.
16
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2. The beginning
Urban regimes are historical formations with their own life cycle8: an incubation step
sets the stage for the start, a phase of consolidation and stabilization follows and then
the regime declines more or less rapidly. The Turin regime has followed the same cycle:
its curve rose slowly, culminated a bit beyond the half of the first decade of the new
century and then it bent sharply.
17
The gestation period of this regime lasted from the mid-Eighties until its official
birth, which coincided with the results of the municipal election in 1993, when a center-
left coalition led by an academic professor (Valentino Castellani) unexpectedly beat the
left-wing coalition led by the mayor who had governed the city in the Seventies (Diego
Novelli). This outcome depended on several circumstances, some of which were
intentional efforts, while others random events.
18
The main boost for political change was the economic crisis affecting the city since
the late Seventies. Industrial restructurings, relocations and closures of factories made
people aware that the city had to deal with these problems in the short time if it didn’t
want to fall into an irreversible decline.
19
In this scenario - common to many European and American cities - a group of
intellectuals belonging to the reformist wing of the left developed, since the mid-
Eighties, a collective reflection on the nature of the urban crisis. It also outlined the
axes of a project for the modernization of politics and local economy, leading to a
vigorous public debate in the political and business circles of the city9. That debate
produced the institutionalized corpus (Schmidt 2010) of ideas, narratives and claims
around which the coalition would consolidate and the future politics would take shape.
20
In terms of claims, the group criticized the politics and culture of the previous city
governments. Four were the main objections: a) the anachronistic belief that large
manufacturing companies were still the heart of the social system and the only driving
force of the economic development, b) the tendency to reproduce into the
administrative context the class divisions of the industrial environment, c) the lack of a
negotiation habit into both industrial and political relations, d) the lack of management
skills, procedural rationality and administrative know-how in the political class (Berta
and Chiamparino 1987, Bagnasco 1986 and 1990).
21
In terms of purposes, in order to bring politics back in, policy-makers had to
innovate not only the outputs (the agenda) but also the processes (how they were
governing the city). The agenda could be nothing but a set of growth-oriented policies,
diversifying the economy, attracting companies and resources, valorizing the ‘hidden
treasures’ of the territory. Welfare policies were a constraint, but not a priority
anymore. The policy-making process had to be reformed through the
institutionalization of governance practices, more effective in solving problems than the
top-down model. As hierarchical public institutions were not able to manage social
complexity and the market came out to be insufficient to ensure integration and
consensus, the policy-making could only be based on negotiations and agreements
between public institutions and civil society organizations10.
22
This core of purposes, which initially divided political forces in two opposing sides,
soon became hegemonic connecting with spontaneous initiatives of business actors and
with the centrifugal forces that tore left-wing parties and trade unions. Gathered
around the powerful president of the local Chamber of Commerce, businessmen and
professionals formed the ‘Group of 70’ with the aim of proposing a candidate
alternative to the one of the ‘radical’ left and supporting a new coalition and a new
agenda focused on the economic growth. The Group of 70 prepared a document (Torino
23
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In the decision-making vacuum generated by Tangentopoli and by the crisis of
political parties, which was strongly felt especially among industry and finance
environments,[…] we started to promote our proposal with the strategies to be
followed. X was the most visible person, whom people identified as the deus ex
machina, but initially we were a group of six businessmen, afterwards reached
by many others. (I.29)
Fig. 1. The establishment of the urban regime in Turin
3. The regime machine : agenda,
coalitions, resources
Incontra 1992) composed of 18 points explaining which policy issues the next city
government should privilege. One of the protagonists of this pioneering experience
remembers that time with the following words:
After long and tense debates, the Left Democrats Party (PDS), heir of the old
Communist Party, endorsed the idea of a radical change in political strategies and,
together with these new groups of the ‘civil society’, proposed a common candidate
alternative to the former left-wing mayor Novelli. At the end, the new candidate - the
future mayor Castellani - was supported by the most moderate members of the Left
(PDS and Greens), by many circles of intellectuals, professionals, businessmen and
representatives of Catholic and liberal associations. This new coalition settled at the top
of the municipal administration, keeping the reins of the city government for four
mandates.
24
Come to think of it, although the activism of the reformers and the demand for
change coming from the city, the establishment of the new government cycle is the
product of a non-linear dynamics involving exogenous streams and endogenous forces,
which not necessarily need to meet11. The catalyst was the political crisis of 1992-1993
broken out with the scandals of ‘Tangentopoli’ and worsened by the collapse of public
finance and by the delegitimization of the ruling classes and the parties (fig. 1). The sum
of these exogenous phenomena opened up a ‘policy window’ that let change supporters
fill that political space (Kingdon 1984, Baumgartner and Jones 1993).
25
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Fig. 2. A map of the polycentric sub-agenda
After the 1993 elections, the agenda setting took place both informally (in unofficial
and decentralized places) and within official arenas through formal commitments12.
Three documents may be considered the key instruments of the agenda. The original
core ideas were formulated in the aforementioned ‘18 theses for the development of
Turin’, wherein the local business elite offered its recipe for stimulating urban growth.
The second key instrument was the new General Plan (approved in 1995), which
established guidelines and criteria for the use of urban spaces. The projects of the first
government phase found a synthesis in the First Strategic Plan of the city (Torino
Internazionale 2000)13, followed by a Second Strategic Plan (Torino Internazionale
2006). These documents expressed a core of guiding ideas capable of aggregating a
wide range of interests and of inspiring a broad assortment of policies.
26
The main intention - changing Turin into a post-industrial metropolis based on
technology and culture - gradually took shape divided in three different sub-agendas14.
27
The programme of the first sub-agenda might be summed up into the expression
polycentric city. It is an urban planning agenda that focused on housing and
infrastructures (some of them were projects not realized by previous governments). The
projects related to the 2006 Olympic Winter Games updated and enriched (but in many
ways also distorted) the guidelines defined by the Plan. After almost twenty years, the
visible result of this plan is an urban development that drastically reshaped the
landscape of the city. The change was mainly due to the work of the Railway Loop
(more than 7 km of tracks were pitted), the new buildings in the abandoned industrial
areas and along some main roads, the urban regeneration projects in some poor
neighborhoods, the expansion of the two academic institutions in the city (Polytechnic
and University), the restoration of buildings and monuments in the central area, the
construction of the new railway station and the renovation of the old one (fig. 2).
28
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Fig. 3. Research centres and technological poles in Turin
The second sub-agenda evoked the idea of a polytechnic city, for the main target was
transforming Turin into a high-tech cluster: a knowledge machine where the innovative
technical and organizational skills could meet the industrial tradition and the
knowledge developed within the two academic institutions and research centres of the
city. In this perspective, the University and Polytechnic started ambitious plans of
expansion (in terms of structures and research centres15) and created two business
incubators and three poles to host innovative companies (Environment Park for green-
economy companies, Multimedia Park for the film industry and Turin New Economy,
located in the area of the old Fiat main factory). Overall research and technological
centres grew from 7 in the early Nineties up to 24 in 2010 (fig. 3).
29
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For the third axis we use the label pyrotechnic city. The intention here is to promote
projects and initiatives aimed at making culture ‘the new job in the city’, assuming that
culture might be a lever for economic growth in a post-Fordist society. Inspired by the
entertainment machine model of other urban experiences (Lloyd and Clark 2001), the
city should become a ‘creative district’ full of cultural activities and services, but also a
‘market of entertainments’ addressed to intellectual classes, young people and the
residents of the gentrified centre. Leisure and tourism, exhibitions and scientific
meetings, religious celebrations and festivals seemed to be a smart remedy to industrial
decline. The organization of big events became the most visible component of the new
urban politics of culture. The 2006 Winter Olympics marked the climax, but also many
other events attracted people and mobilized substantial economic and organizational
resources16. At the same time, the museum system and the film and theatre sectors
were reorganized and received new resources (fig. 4)17.
30
Fig. 4. The cultural system in Turin31
31/03/15 13:30Policy change without metamorphosis. The 1993-2011 urban regime in Turin
Pagina 10 di 27http://metropoles.revues.org/4642
Tab. 1. Governance coalition
A governance coalition of public and private actors contributed, with different
incidence and determination, to implement the agenda by supporting and financing
projects and initiatives (tab. 1).
32
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The organizations supporting the polycentric sub-agenda primarily referred to the
Association of builders as the main focal point. Around it, a dense network of secondary
stakeholders committed to the ‘land community’ contributed to sustain the agenda: the
Faculty of Architecture, big architectural and engineering firms, local banks,
33
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In the polycentric agenda [...] there was a lack of planning and public
institutions adopted the strategy to adapt their decisions to the pressures of real
estate interests due to the need of raising cash. (I.24)
Partnerships involving Polytechnic, University and private companies have
often worked thanks to the mediation of the Region, which finally chose to
support projects on the basis of a long-term plan and using objective criteria.
(I.32)
associations of small business and large-scale distribution, the downtown property
holders, some football clubs. Fiat behaved here as a holder of large building lots
negotiating favourable agreements with public institutions. Public institutions - the
Municipality and in some policies also the Region - played a role of intermediation and
coordination among the real estate interests and between them and higher levels of
government. Overall, the prevailing pattern of cooperation was based on temporary
agreements mostly satisfying short-term interests (for example concessions in
exchange for tax revenue).
In the knowledge coalition, public institutions - City and Region, especially in some
key departments or through public Agencies - were more far-sighted, promoting and
supporting long-term projects.
34
The two Turin bank foundations helped implement the sub-agenda through ad hoc
funding, while University and Polytechnic contributed mostly with their innovative
potential of the applied research and the business incubators. The business community,
particularly the larger companies, appeared here in the background. High-tech and ICT
companies occasionally participated in some projects, while Fiat was not interested to
invest resources and know-how in this field.
35
Usually, the entertainment machines are led by coalitions where the business sector
specialized in producing and supplying cultural services holds the leadership (Lloyd
and Clark 2001). In Turin, on the contrary, public and nonprofit institutions played a
significant role, leading as well as financing projects, in a sort of diarchy with the
Municipality, especially with its Department of Culture, directed by a skilled politician,
who managed to weave a dense network of relationships to support this issue. But
equally important was the power of the two bank foundations, which sometimes
became a sort of shadow departments, acting proactively and not only financing single
projects. If these are the pivotal actors, also development agencies, cultural associations
and the University (in its sectors most linked to the territory) contributed with projects
and know-how.
36
Consolidation and legitimation of urban regimes go hand in hand with the
mobilization of public and private resources (Stone 1993; 2004). From the late Nineties
to the early years of the new century, Turin could actually rely on huge resources, partly
provided by the coalition partners and partly by the government and the EU. Public
resources, however, were far greater than the private ones18. In addition to the ordinary
municipal funds19, a huge flow of special funding came from the state: transfers for
special projects like the Olympics and the new subway; transfers coming from the
European Urban II programme to finance urban regeneration projects20, funds
allocated by the National Railways Society for the Railway Loop. Other capitals were
raised through debt: the City borrowed up to € 3.5 billion, making Turin the most
indebted Italian city. Among the cities of the country Turin became one of the most
assisted by public money.
37
Alongside the public commitment, the two bank foundations contributed with
significant investments, especially in the sectors of culture and research and
38
31/03/15 13:30Policy change without metamorphosis. The 1993-2011 urban regime in Turin
Pagina 12 di 27http://metropoles.revues.org/4642
Bank foundations have strongly supported the world of culture and (partly)
research, without their contribution Turin would not have done what it did.
(I.32)
4. The governing elite
The growth was the objective of our project, but there was no alternative, any
city is forced to shape the policy agenda to attract business (I.6). The idea was
to invest in economic development to increase the overall wealth and only
subsequently to be able to redistribute it. (I.17)
innovation21. As an interviewee stated:
Their increasing incidence in policies made them not only core actors of the urban
regime, but also countercyclical institutions and potential guarantors of urban
economic stability.
39
Compared to the semi-public22 and public resources mobilized for the agenda,
private money has been by far scarcer. With the exception of some funding for the
polytechnic agenda, the contribution of the business sector is actually marginal,
especially in relation to strategic projects23.
40
Despite these imbalances, the mobilization of money is overall impressive. At least
until 2007, when the first signs of the international crisis appeared, the resources
seemed to be adequate to support a really ambitious government programme.
41
In addition to material resources (and partly because of them) the coalition could
count on intangible resources: a high level of political stability (partly due to the direct
election of the mayor) and an unprecedented consensus towards the second mayor
(partly due to the success of the Olympic Games).
42
An urban coalition politically acts through an informal group of people who, by virtue
of their position, prestige, ability, is able to directly or indirectly influence the policy-
making. Although the urban regime approach does not focus on ‘who governs’, but on
‘how’ a regime machine is established and works, it seems reasonable to assume that
composition and quality of the governing elite affect methods and outcomes of
administrative action, reinforcing or depressing it (Stone 2002). Therefore, the
characteristics of the elite and the relationships among its components, and between
them and the surrounding society, provide useful information to understand limits and
prospects of an urban regime.
43
In Turin, the formation of a governing elite is the result of a slow process of amalgam
(more than circulation)24. At the turn of the century it has acquired a relatively stable
and recognizable profile: little more than a hundred middle-aged educated men (only
11% are women), with executive positions in public and private organizations of local
governance.
44
The ideological unity is a crucial aspect. Although the group contains all the three
major political cultures of the last sixty years (Catholic, socialist-communist and
liberal), almost all members share the same paradigm of economic growth to reach
through developmental policies.
45
On the contrary, the socio-professional profile of the members is highly
heterogeneous. There is an almost perfect balance between politicians (both party
professionals and career politicians), members of the local business class and
professionals of the nonprofit sector. This means that about 65% of the members comes
46
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Fig. 5. Socio-professional backgrounds of élite members
These networks date back to the early years of university or even high school. In
the academic milieu ties are active since the time of the activism of student
groups. The milieu called ex-PCI date back to the grassroots party activism of
the Seventies. The milieu Fiat was composed by the network of people
surrounding Giovanni Agnelli, including the Industrial Union. The Catholic
milieu matters very much because it cuts across different networks, innervating
from ‘civil society’, with different backgrounds: people who worked for private
corporations, people who grew up professionally in academic institutions, people
coming from associations or public institutions (fig. 5).
The access to governing elite seems to be related, rather than with membership in
and loyalty to a party, with cooptation mechanisms of some local environments
particularly active in selecting local neo-notables: the ‘milieux’. The milieux are
networks based on family ties, friendships, professional, political or religious links,
which work as elitist communities of speech and political socialization. Belonging to a
milieu gives social capital, provides relational and reputational resources to spend in
the public sphere.
47
Two thirds of the elite members seem strongly linked to a milieu. Some of them come
from the ‘world Fiat’, including the network of relationships linking the Agnelli family
and its closer friends, past managers and professionals from the entourage. The
‘academic’ milieu is of growing importance , represented by a large group of professors
(mostly from the Polytechnic and the Faculty of Economics and Law) who often have
become consultants of local administrations. From the ‘ex-PCI’ milieu we could spot
the communist cadres of the political generation that occupied local and regional
governments in the Seventies and Eighties. The other components are the liberal-
masonic, mostly inspired by liberal principles, and the Catholic one, internally
composite but broadly in line with the guidelines of the Church and the principles of
social Catholicism (tab. 2).
48
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also the other milieux (I.9). These groups provide an identity. Belonging to a
milieu helps keeping a collective identity because the linkages last for years and
even decades. (I.4)
Tab. 2. The milieux in Turin25
Today parties [...] are mainly intended to recruit the political class : choosing
deputies, choosing local aldermen a little less [...], but just offering lists of
individuals, who might be appreciated by certain vested interests (I.19).
[Parties] do not have a say in ruling class’ selection and party affiliation is
irrelevant to be a decision-maker. X supports Party A, of course, but it’s like if I
am fan of Juventus, nothing more than that. If X has power, it’s not because of
the support by his party (I.30). Parties are now machines that do not know the
territory, [...] they are places where we talk about people rather than policies
(I.3).
Fig. 6. The élite as a positional network
Milieu Elite members
none 31 %
academic (University) 15 %





Disproving a recurrent stereotype, while the milieux gain growing importance in
political life, the power of parties declines. All evidence collected confirms that parties
less and less affect the selection of the ruling class and that they are able neither to lead
(or to prevent) the most important public choices nor to mobilize citizens for collective
goals26.
49
Finally, analyzed as a positional network (fig. 6)27, the elite shows a polycratic
structure, with quite dense and resistant links28, but with a weak centralization29,
confirming the absence of a leadership (Watts and Strogatz 1998).
50
31/03/15 13:30Policy change without metamorphosis. The 1993-2011 urban regime in Turin
Pagina 15 di 27http://metropoles.revues.org/4642
5. A weak regime
There is not a core group of people holding positions in many strategic organizations,
an interlocking directorate which might control the connections of the whole
network30.
51
All these cultural, socio-professional and structural attributes design a very different
group from those described by the classical elitists. The Turin governing elite is neither
a top leadership (Hunter 1953) or a power elite (Wright Mills 1956), that imposes its
choices to the community, nor an inner circle (Useem 1984), which concentrates
strategic positions in few hands. It rather works like a field of almost horizontal
interpersonal relationships wherein members discuss, negotiate, decide emphasizing
shared goals and controlling the conflict through cross-subsidies and co-optation of
friends and enemies. The Turin elite looks more like a ‘central circle’ (Moore 1979), who
does not act to dominate, but with tasks of communication, coordination, brokerage
and cooptation. The label ‘distributed leadership’ expresses with sufficient accuracy the
structural and functional nature of the group.
52
The effectiveness of this regime has been uneven. It may be defined effective in some
policy-sectors (large-scale infrastructures, leisure and tourism), but it seems
unsatisfactory in others (economic internationalization, research and innovation,
environmental sustainability, the new welfare) and it fails to achieve its systemic
purposes : a radical change of the city’s pattern of development. Despite the optimistic
view of one of the two mayors31, the old ‘one-company town’ has actually not given the
way to a more advanced social and productive equilibrium, based on innovation and
knowledge. Turin is today productively weaker than twenty years ago (Fiat seems
willing to leave the city in the next future, as well as the main bank, some foreign
private research centres have closed while others are lacking money), and the future
remains uncertain (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012). ‘Policy change without metamorphosis’
53
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is the expression that best sums up the meaning of this twenty-year transition.
Then, what has prevented an ambitious, rich and strongly appreciated urban politics
to achieve its goals ? Our answer is that the urban regime in Turin, even in the period of
greatest activism and maximum consensus, has been a weak regime, unable to give the
transformation a unique and stable direction.
54
Strong urban regimes are probably the minority, if not the exception32. In principle,
the conditions favouring the establishment of a robust regime are essentially two : a)
the action of a cohesive group of actors in support of a long-term agenda, mutually
accountable and available to equally bear the costs of the collective action ; b) the
compatibility between purposes and resources. In the case of Turin, these conditions
are only partially met. Important weakness factors are present since the formation of
the regime. They remained latent during the period of huge transfers from the state,
but they come up as soon as the first exogenous difficulties arise.
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The judgment ‘Too many irons in the fire’, suggested by an interviewee, summarized
the first element of weakness : an agenda being too dispersive, whereas only a small
group of locality-wide priorities could have been sufficiently coherent to maximize the
effectiveness of the resources. At first glance, the activism of policy-makers on several
fronts might look like a sign of the will to overcome a monochord urban model based
on automotive industry. On closer inspection, however, the dispersion of resources
across heterogeneous policy issues has prevented from reaching the critical mass
needed to trigger the transformation of the system. The three sub-agendas are not
integrated into a single project of urban change, but they proceed separately, each
claiming the strategic primacy and aiming to grab the maximum amount of resources.
The idea of a city of knowledge, based on the production of enhanced services related to
digital economy, would have required to concentrate a great part of the resources on
the polytechnic sub-agenda. On the contrary, this agenda has been the less financially
supported and certainly the less effective33. In the long term, the other two agendas
have become predominant. Their less innovative nature and especially their stronger
linkage to local short-term interests have implied a significant dispersion of resources,
thereby inhibiting systemic change. The new urban infrastructures (in particular those
related to the Olympics), as well as initiatives related to entertainment and tourism
have made Turin a more attractive and lively city (‘always on the move’, according to
the slogan labeled by the municipal administration), but another economic model has
not superseded the old one.
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In the light of our interviews, the main factor contributing to this outcome has been
the obsession of politicians to increase consensus including a very wide range of social
forces in the governance coalition, many of which interested more in side benefits that
in strategic projects and therefore less inclined to engage their own resources in the
collective action. Two main factors might have played an important role in the
promotion of this bulimic agenda by the coalition : the initial wide availability of funds,
which has not encouraged a careful selection of priorities,,and a certain planning
euphoria of some elite seduced by the rhetoric of the strategic planning and fascinated
by a smart city marketing.
57
The second element of weakness lies in the asymmetric engagement of the main
players of the governance coalition : public institutions, business community and bank
foundations. In principle, this kind of coalition could be very balanced, since each part
would be able to provide huge resources. De facto, financial contributions to collective
action are uneven, swinging and diverted by opportunistic temptations.
58
The Municipality and the Region restrict their action to a role of coordination and
risk absorption and exercise their leadership only in few cases, self-limiting their
59
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Conclusions
‘potential power’. This could be reasonable in a governance scenario wherein each actor
invests consistent resources in the projects. But the contribution of the business
community to the change efforts is often limited, episodic, and sometimes reticent34. In
such unbalanced system, public institutions renounce both to claim the respect of the
agreements and to keep under control the systemic consistency of the policies.
If the lack of financial support from the business community is undoubtedly a
weakness factor of the regime, uncertain is the effect of the powerful role of the bank
foundations in the agenda-setting and policy-making. Between public and private
actors, the action of the two bank foundations is quantitatively significant (for they
finance many policies and single projects) and qualitatively important (for they
substitute ‘public power’ in its role of leadership in some areas, such as arts & culture
and technological innovation). The presence of these semi-public financial institutions
among the top players and their prominent role of mediation between public and
private sector is an unusual element within the international framework of urban
regimes.
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The last reason of weakness deals with the composition of the local ruling elite and
its relationship with the societal environment. At first glance, the combination of
heterogeneous backgrounds and ideological conformism seems to guarantee
representativeness and unity. The elite is deeply rooted in the prominent civil society
and it is culturally cohesive, able to play as a collective actor. On closer inspection,
however, a ruling class largely dominated by neo-notables coming from the milieux
tends to reproduce itself, keeping out innovative forces : it is no accident that in its
ranks the creative classes (knowledge workers and professionals of the digital society)
are marginal. Moreover, the reluctance to include the forces of the emerging post-
industrial society must be seen in conjunction with the lack of internal circulation and
relationships with citizens. Beyond the rhetoric of inclusion, the elite does not pursue
the participation of local citizens, but their acquiescence and their applause as viewers,
consumers, tourists : an audience to cherish and to poll, but to keep far from policy-
making. The absence of parties capable of mobilizing energies and passions of the
people certainly contributes to this attitude, as well as the lack of a credible opposition
able to challenge the establishment. More than the myth of the ‘democratic revolution’
evoked at the turn of 1993, the regime appears to belong to the Gramsci’s category of
‘passive revolution’.
61
The combination of these weakness factors makes the regime machine quickly
decline, after the peak of popularity and success in the first years of the new century.
62
The Turin urban regime may be considered a weak regime, in spite of the good
reputation it has enjoyed, its favourable circumstances (the political and institutional
crisis of 1992, the short recovery of Fiat in 2004 and 2005, the Winter Olympics) and
the huge resources which it could rely on, Weak because of an overly ambitious agenda
without a dominant core which to concentrate efforts and resources on ; weak because
of the scarce and conditional support of the private partners and because of the
unbalanced engagement of the public authorities (financially highly exposed but
without leading the decision-making process) ; in the end weak because of the
composition of a ruling elite mainly formed by neo-notables coming from cliques and
far from the citizens.
63
Although many important changes took place and reshaped the face of the city,64
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making it aesthetically more pleasant, culturally livelier, socially more differentiated,
politically more dynamic, the urban regime in Turin failed the challenge of leading the
city from the one-company town to a knowledge-based international metropolis. The
sum of the policy changes has not produced the desired evolutionary leap in the pattern
of urban development.
The analysis of this experience also sheds light on the dynamics that favoured its
establishment, consolidation and functioning. If this case could be considered
representative of urban regimes, for it points out the crucial role of intellectuals and
ideas in stimulating the regime incubation and legitimation, its development seems
partially deviating from what stated by the mainstream theory based on the American
urban dynamics. The first anomaly lies in the growing power exercised by bank
foundations, able to triangle with public authorities and business elite on equal terms
and in some cases from a leading position (this element makes Turin probably different
also from most of the other European cities). Atypical is also the strong reliance of the
regime on public resources (this difference between European cities and American ones
has often been highlighted).
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Last but not least, this research has also attempted to fill a gap in the theory,
correlating urban regime and ruling class, since we think that the profile of the latter
might affect the resilience and strength of the former. In this case study, the ruling class
contains elements of strength and weakness. On the one hand, the mix between social
heterogeneity, cultural unity and distributed leadership seems to favour the regime
stability. On the other hand, a ruling class mostly coming from the milieux seems to
limit the innovative potential of the agenda.
66
Although one case study cannot authorize to generalize the results, the analysis on
the ruling class might offer useful insights to develop a more complex urban regime
theory, in order to increase its heuristic capacity.
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To reconstruct the nature and dynamics of the 1993-2011 government cycle, our six-year work
has been based on documentary sources and 37 in-depth interviews (even several times) with
qualified witnesses. The witnesses were chosen because of their proximity to the environments
‘that count’ and/or their position as privileged observers of the policy-making processes
related to the agenda.
To identify the components of the ruling elite we combined the reputational method with the
positional method, ‘corrected’ through a decisional method. With the positional method we
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Tab. 1. The ICR
Notes
1  The analysis presented in this article succinctly reformulates the findings of a study
conducted between 2006 and 2011 (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012). For methodological details see
the Appendix.
2  The opportunity to apply to Europe a model created to study American urban contexts,
selected an initial group of individuals with top positions in Turin ‘preminent’ organizations35
between 2001 and 2006. The group was made up of 2266 people occupying 2768 positions in
638 organizations. An index of civic relevance (ICR), which took into account both the
functional relevance of the organization (OR) and the number and type of positions held (PR)
was then assigned to each individual in the group (tab. 1). The list of people deriving from this
first selection was cleared by individuals with an ICR lower than a (necessarily arbitrarily)
‘threshold of civic relevance’ (275, indicative of different situations, but equivalent to the
possession of two charges, one of which displaying the highest ICR value). This procedure
produced a group of 94 individuals. At the same time, exploring news in the two best selling
newspapers (‘La Repubblica’ and ‘La Stampa’) between 2001 and 2006, we drew up a list of
people emerged as much influential in the city. Then we used the judgment of 45 privileged
observers (chosen for their acquaintances in heterogeneous environments) to correct the list36.
The reputational method generated a group of 52 individuals. The ruling class was the sum
(excluding overlaps) of the members of the two groups : 120 people with top positions in
almost two hundreds organizations.
* Organizations performing multiple functions have been assigned the score of the most
important function.
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which are culturally, socially and structurally different from European cities, has been the
subject of an extensive debate (Harding 1999; Savitch and Kantor 2005; Mossberger and
Stoker 2001).
3  Two prejudices failed: 1) cities are disconnected from the nerve-center of national and
international decisional system; 2) in order to understand problems and find solutions looking
at the national level is enough.
4  Stone (2002) defines the urban agenda as a set of key commitments, which are priority
setting-oriented.
5  The so-called ‘maintenance regimes’ seem to exclude this aspect by the class of regimes, but
they are mostly types of urban regime affecting small and peripheral towns (Stone 1993).
6  With some lag, we may say that the following distinctions belong to this dichotomous model:
‘managerial’, ‘routinized’, ‘Keynesian’, ‘redistributive’, ‘social centered’ regimes vs
‘entrepreneurial’, ‘strategic’, ‘Schumpeterian’, ‘capital driven’, ‘market oriented’ regimes
(Peterson 1981; Elkin 1987; Savitch and Kantor 2002 and 2005; Sassen 2009).
7  For example, during the last two decades, Monaco of Bavaria and the capital of Texas,
Austin, have almost exclusively focused on the development of scientific research and ICT.
8  For this reason, according to Stone, they ‘are perhaps best studied over time’ (Stone 1989,
9).
9  There are cultural and political personalities gravitating around the institutions of the
labour movement (primarily the Gramsci Institute), Fiat (the Agnelli Foundation) and the
Financial Textile Group, as well as representatives of the Academy and of the Research
Institute of the Region (Ires Piemonte). The reflection was developed by Bagnasco (1986 and
1990) and Castronovo (1987) and the journal ‘Sisifo’, as well as on the local pages of major
newspapers.
10  For a detailed and more thorough description of the debate see Belligni and Ravazzi 2012.
11  With the new municipal electoral system, Castellani won thanks to the strategic votes of the
Northern League electorate.
12  The sources used to retrace the urban agenda are: Torino Incontra (1992, 1997), Torino
Internazionale (2000, 2006), City of Turin (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2008), Russo and
Terna (2004 ); Dente et al. (2005), Bonomi and Cominu (2007); Comitato Giorgio Rota
(2000-2011); Dondona (2008), The newspaper ‘Repubblica’, edition of Turin (from 2000 to
2010). We also used data and results of a research conducted by Bruno Dente on 23 policies
implemented in Turin (Dente et al. 2005).
13  The Plan included a vision, 6 strategic lines, 20 targets, 84 actions.
14  About the distinction between governmental agenda (the dominant intentions) and
decision-making agenda (the set of policies), see Kingdon (1984).
15  The new projects concerned many fields of knowledge: telecommunications and
information technology, aerospace, physics, genetics, chemistry, biotechnology, economics and
restoration of cultural heritage.
16  To name only the best known events: Artissima, Traffic, Salone del Gusto, Salone del Libro,
Settembre Musica-MITO, Torino Spiritualità, Biennale Democrazia.
17  For a list of all the policies in the three sub-agendas see Belligni and Ravazzi 2012.
18  Only for 2006 Olympic Games 3 billion of public money arrived in Turin.
19  With the gradual downsizing of Fiat, the Municipality of Turin became the first company in
town by number of employees: a holding that managed a huge economic and financial asset,
increased in recent years by the dividends of its investee companies (approximately 80 million
from 2008 to 2010).
20  In 1998 the innovative ‘Special Project for Suburbs’ (Progetto Speciale Periferie) started to
regenerate some poor neighborhoods located in peripheral areas. The ‘Neighborhood Contract’
(Contratto di Quartiere) became the innovative tools to design integrated policies involving
residents of the neighborhoods.
21  From 1997 to 2009, the two foundations have invested about € 1.5 billion in the city.
22  Italian bank foundations are private institutions but with some legal  constraints that make
them de facto semi-public institutions: a) since 1999 they can only invest in the sectors
established by law (research, education, conservation and enhancement of the cultural and
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environmental heritage, health and social assistance); b) since 2002, the 70% of the members
of the Management Board must be appointed by local public institutions (Region, Province,
Municipality, Chamber of Commerce).
23  The president of the Industrial Union of Turin admits that ‘Among European cities, over
the past twenty years, Turin has been one of the most capable of change, as we have often
repeated. This change was funded in large part by public funds, no longer available’ (L.
Mattioli, La creatività ci salverà, in ‘La Repubblica’, 25 September 2012).
24 The period chosen for the selection and the analysis of the governing elite extends from
2001 to 2006, universally considered the pinnacle of the cycle. For methodological details
about members’ identification see Appendix. The information collected on the members was
reconstructed through documentary sources (newspaper articles, curricula available on the
Web) and through 37 interviews with people chosen because of their knowledge of the
environments close to power (see the Methodological appendix for more details).
25  Some people are linked to more than a milieu, but one is always dominant and we have
referred to this in the count.
26  As an interviewee admits, ‘If you ask me what I mainly identify with, if with my party or my
milieu, I would say at once: the  latter’ (I.17).
27  The network has been reconstructed (using the software Pajek) from organization
memberships (the link between two individuals descends from their common membership in
one or more organizations).
28  The average clustering coefficient (0.576) suggests a relatively cohesive network.
29  The measures of centrality that we have considered are: degree centrality, which measures
the connectivity of a node and it is calculated as the ratio between the real number and the
potential number of its links; betweenness centrality, which measures the importance of a
node in connecting efficiently (through the shortest path) all pairs of nodes of the network
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). In relation to the first kind of centrality, the number of direct
contacts of the most central node is less than a fifth of the maximum amount (23 out of 120:
19%). With regard to the second, individuals with the highest values ​​are not systemic brokers
(they are not able to connect parts of the network otherwise isolated. For details see Belligni,
Ravazzi and Salerno (2008).
30  Most components of the elite cumulate no more than 4 positions, maximum 2 of which
have strategic relevance.
31  According to the mayor Castellani ‘the agenda that we developed in 1993 has reached -
more or less - all its objectives’ (Castellani and Damiano 2011, 13).
32  The empirical evidence shows that not every regime is robust. On the contrary, many cities
show what we may call a ‘weak’ regime (Stone 2002).
33  Citing only the two main failures of this agenda, the biggest (339 researchers and
employees) private research centre created in the city (by Motorola) closed in 2008 after a few
years of activity and ‘Turin New Economy’, an agency created for managing brownfield sites
sold by Fiat to local public institutions, finds it hard to take off.
34  The waiver of the big local companies (Fiat and Telecom first) to invest in innovative
projects in synergy with the research sector is astonishing above all.
35  The criteria to select the ‘preminent’ organizations were: a) formal role in decision-making
(all public and semi-public organizations and associations recognized as decision-makers in
public fora and policy tables); b) a significant budget or a large amount of employees.
36  Names which were either proposed or rejected by at least 11 out of 45 interviewees were
added or removed from the list.
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